The forces that drew together Cox and Perry at that wooden conference table in Memphis were greater than either of them could have imagined. Insurance companies like Cox and Perry's built their fortunes providing products and services to an almost exclusively black clientele. Beginning in the early 1880s, white-owned insurance companies cited what they claimed were scientifi c, neutral, and objective measures of diseased, inferior, and degenerate black bodies. They ignored social and economic factors such as poverty and segregation and scientists' inherent racist biases to argue blacks were not only inherently inferior in vitality but also prone to social and physical diseases. They then relied on such science to justify charging higher rates, reducing benefi ts, and denying coverage altogether. Ironically, by the 1920s, many of the same companies coveted the client base of black companies, though notions of black inferiority and degeneracy persisted.
Successes like Cox and Perry's had also raised the hackles of state insurance commissioners, who sometimes colluded with white-owned insurance companies to exert various forms of legal pressure and bureaucratic intimidation. Commissioners bullied and, in many cases, dismantled black-owned insurance companies and other fi nancial organizations that lay within their regulatory reach. Reform-minded politicians and regulators compelled the state to protect legitimate social institutions. Too often, however, they narrowly defi ned legitimate institutions. Though some companies were certainly in need of reform, the state responded in ways that treated blacks' economic and political agency, especially building fi nancial institutions, as a threat to, rather than a model of, the possibilities of democracy and economic opportunity.
In addition to the external pressures of aggressive competition and rapacious regulation, practical and personal matters dogged Cox and Perry. Corporate fraud and mismanagement as well as personal ambition and rivalries underlay confl icting motives for their merger. Together, all of these forces undermined Cox's vision to create the largest black-owned insurance company in the United States. It also led to the rapid demise of both Cox's and Perry's companies.
Minnie Geddings Cox faced considerable challenges in building and maintaining a successful insurance company. Uncovering her experiences involves considerable challenges as well. The lack of business records and personal correspondence force a reliance on other records, such as census data, newspapers, biographies, and other published primary source material. These materials cannot convey a complete picture, particularly the thoughts, feeling, and motivations of key actors. A full fi nancial picture of the company also eludes even the most determined scholar. However, it is imperative to reconstruct stories like Cox's that have been marginalized in large part because of the paucity of sources.
In building and maintaining a successful insurance company, Cox shared the experiences of other business owners, regardless of race or sex. She had to create and implement a marketing and growth strategy, stay abreast of trends and developments in the industry, and hire and manage employees. She also had to work with a board of directors, shareholders, company offi cials, and customers. She stayed apprised of regulations in the industry, fi led state reports, and paid taxes and fees.
In other ways, race, gender, and class intersected to work to her advantage and disadvantage. Because of her race, she faced considerable challenges in building a successful business. Cox lived and worked in Mississippi, "the most southern place on earth," 2 a place where the siren song of New South rhetoric stressed inclusion in a national (and global) drive for U.S. economic ascendancy at the same time it crystallized racial hierarchies. Blacks lacked adequate access to capital, credit, and training, which not only hampered their ability to compete but also left them vulnerable to corruption and mismanagement. Threats and actual instances of violence also underscored efforts to keep blacks' ambitions in check.
However, because of race, the insurance industry excluded a broad swath of potential clients and created an underserved market. Fraternal insurance initially fi lled the gap, and its success led to the creation of insurance companies. These companies appealed to race pride and positioned their businesses as tangible evidence of black self-help, uplift, and progress.
Cox's gender added another layer of complexity. She strived in an industry that positioned women as dependents in dire need of the protections that insurance products offered. Women were not imagined as either the proper producers or consumers of insurance products. In addition, her leadership over and the power she exercised in a corporation were unusual for a woman: black or otherwise, inside or outside of the insurance industry. The early twentieth-century notion of captains of industry invoked a masculine image of "legitimate"-and preferred-leadership in the business community. However, she placed trusted male advisors in key positions, which allowed her to appear removed from the main workings of power.
Class, too, presented challenges and opportunities for Cox. Black insurance companies acted with profi ts in mind; they were sometimes accused-and often justifi ably so-of preying on the lower classes. Poor-and working-class customers sometimes could not afford to keep up with their payments, even though they were only a few cents a week. Many were illiterate and sometimes cheated out of their rightful benefi ts. However, Cox also promoted men and especially women who would have worked in fi elds and kitchens to white-collar jobs, but she did not hesitate to deny sharecroppers and domestics benefi ts if the company could. Finally, blacks who appeared too successful could incur the wrath of jealous whites.
The 1923 encounter between Cox and Perry then represented a nexus of race, gender, and class within early twentieth century U.S. capitalism but also in the black separate economy. Cox, forced to operate at the margins of the insurance industry, met the challenge and created a successful company. Her experiences with Mississippi Life refl ect the limits and possibilities of black female corporate leadership at the turn of the twentieth century.
A Monument of Protest: Origins of the Mississippi Life Insurance Company
Minnie M. Geddings was born in the small town of Lexington, Holmes County, Mississippi, in 1869 to former slaves William and Mary (or Elizabeth) Geddings. Few details exist about her early life, though it appears she lived a life of some privilege compared to most other blacks living in the Mississippi Delta. 3 Her parents owned a restaurant. Cox attended Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, graduating from its normal school program around 1888. As part of one of the largest cohorts of women (over 100) attending Fisk in the period, Cox imbibed not just an industrial education but also a sense of the leadership potential of educated black women. 4 She returned to Mississippi and taught at the new colored public school in Indianola. Cox's future husband, Wayne Wellington Cox, worked there as principal. In Minnie, Wayne found a woman equal to his ambitions; his future wife purchased the fi rst of her signifi cant real estate holdings a year before they married in October 1889. The couple had one daughter, Ethyl. 5 In 1891, Republican President Benjamin Harrison appointed Cox postmistress of Holmes County, making her the fi rst black woman postmaster in Mississippi. 6 However, around 1902, whites in the Delta-roiled by the combination of a severe drop in cotton prices, attempts by President Theodore Roosevelt to strengthen the southern wing of the Republican Party, and an aggressive political contest for governor-channeled their frustrations onto blacks. Cox found herself caught in the crosshairs. Cox's college education, land and property holdings, civil servant position, and comfortable salary placed her at the center of white resentment and made her a target of violence. In December 1902, after several months of threats and provocations, Cox resigned as postmistress and refused to return to the Indianola Post Offi ce. She and her family fl ed Indianola.
President Theodore Roosevelt refused to accept her resignation and closed the post offi ce. Newspapers from the period referred to incident as the "Indianola Affair." The Indianola Affair sparked the fi rst major national debate about race, states' rights, and federal power since Reconstruction, making Cox a minor footnote in contemporary history textbooks. However, her experiences during the affair shaped her philosophy of building businesses and wealth and inspired other enterprising blacks. 7 After spending more than a year in exile in -american-workers-19thc-2011 -american-workers-19thc- .rtf (accessed April 1, 2015 .
7. For conventional treatments of the Indianola Affair that focus either on James K. Vardaman's election under Mississippi's new direct primary system in 1902, the limitations of two-party politics in the early twentieth-century South, or debates about how "progressive" Roosevelt was on the question of race see, Mowry, "South and Progressive"; De Santis, "Republican Party"; Scheiner, "President Theodore Roosevelt"; and Gatewood, "Theodore Roosevelt." Birmingham, the Coxes returned to Indianola in early 1904. By late 1904, they organized the second black-owned bank in the state, the Delta Penny Savings Bank, which opened for business in early 1905. 8 The Coxes organized the Mississippi Benefi cial Life Insurance Company a few years later, in 1908.
The Delta Penny and Mississippi Life were hardly alone. Hundreds of other black-owned businesses sprang up throughout Mississippi in the early 1900s. Indeed, tens of thousands of blackowned businesses throughout the country ushered in what Juliet E. K. Walker has described as the "Golden Age of Black Business." 9 The growth of the black group economy, businesses owned by blacks focused on an exclusively black clientele, represented more than a capitulation to segregation. 10 They represented a practical riposte to Jim Crow, a system of laws and customs that blocked blacks' ambition and progress through segregation and discrimination, denial of education and civil rights, economic repression, and violence. 11 Wayne Cox described the Delta Penny, Mississippi Life, and other black-owned businesses in the state as "monuments of protest to the injustices infl icted upon him and his wife" during the Indianola Affair. 12 His sentiment expressed that blacks refused to operate at the margins of the Jim Crowed economy and would 9. Walker, "Golden Age of Black Business, 1900 Business, -1930 in The History of Black Business , 10. The black group economy was never completely separate from the mainstream economy. Some whites used the services of black-owned businesses, and black consumers certainly utilized the services of non-black merchants. If the National Negro Business League is an accurate barometer, black business owners remained divided about the effi cacy of pursuing and maintaining a black-only clientele. They debated the problems faced by black business. Some rejected outright a complete reliance on black consumers while others rejected any assistance from whites-as customers or partners.
11 13 They also contribute to and challenge what we know about black business and activism in the "First New South," the period from 1865 to 1920. 14 Blacks in general and black women in particular negotiated a deep set of contradictions. They confronted confl icting messages about their place in this "new" South. Caught between optimistic New South ideology and brutal Jim Crow reality, business provided an effective but very often problematic strategy for dealing with social and economic changes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century New South. Despite assurances by Booker T. Washington and the optimism expressed by other "Negro captains of industry," a coterie of successful, infl uential, self-made men charged with the double duty of creating wealth and social prosperity in the black community while fulfi lling political and cultural obligations to it, a straight line did not proceed from the growth of the black group economy to peaceful racial relations and a progressive business climate.
In addition, captains of industry invoked a decidedly masculine image of black business leadership. When passionate advocates talked about the importance of successful businessmen as the keystone of black economic, social, and political progress, they meant business men . In particular, the insurance industry relied on genderinfused rhetoric that promoted masculine responsibility and duty for dependent and vulnerable women, rhetoric that rendered women the objects of protection and men the ideal producers and consumers of insurance products. Black women certainly challenged such constructions of their role in the industry. Indeed, businesswomen like Cox and others challenged male bodies as the legitimate-and preferred-leaders in the black business community and in the insurance industry.
However, Cox was not a typical black businesswoman. Unlike her contemporaries in the industry, particularly Maggie Lena Walker of the Independent Order of Saint Luke in Richmond, Virginia, Cox does not fi t comfortably in well-elaborated histories of "Sable Victorians": women who shaped and mobilized a politics of respectability through reform, community and social-service institutions, 19 These allegedly scientifi c, neutral, and objective measures ignored social, political, and economic factors such as racist discourses, segregation, and poverty to "prove" that blacks were not only fundamentally inferior in vitality but also inherently prone to social and physical diseases. By the early twentieth century, mortality tables such as the Glover Life Tables relied on cherry-picked census data to substantiate startling disparities in black and white mortality rates. Some fi gures reported black death rates that were twice and even treble the rates for whites. Increasingly throughout the twentieth century, the insurance industry and other kinds of social services and programs relied on actuarial science and other applied social sciences, arguing that scientifi c bases rather than racial sentiment justifi ed the exclusion or disparate treatment of blacks. 20 In addition to scientifi c narratives, industry professionals also exercised social pressure to treat African-American clients differently. In 1903, an anonymous agent in Beekman, New York, wrote that a number of "superior Negroes" had approached him for insurance, but the agent's company refused to insure them. The editor responded, "I do not know of any reputable company which writes negro risks, save with very great caution. Such companies as the Mutual Reserve and others of the off-color sort, write them freely, or used to do so. 22 These models borrowed elements from society's like Dryden's, such as classes of risk based on age. They also capitalized on longstanding features of black secret societies, such as their conviviality, orientation toward self-help, and secrecy.
As racial hierarchies hardened in early twentieth century US culture, economy, and society, these societies also served as circuits of capital for black businesses, loans, and mortgages. The bureaucratic administration, by-laws, and hierarchical leadership associated with running a fraternal insurance business provided unmatched opportunities for business education, training, and leadership. Coupled with their mystery, ritual, and sociability, blacks carved out a space to enact civil and economic rights denied them in larger society. Thousands of secret societies, mutual organizations, and related groups sprang up in black communities from the 1870s to World War I. 23 However, fraternal insurance presented its own challenges. Policies offered limited benefi ts; it was not unusual for an individual to own several different policies with as many societies. Corruption and mismanagement were not uncommon. Customers longed for more anonymity; they desired the fi nancial benefi ts without the need for secret handshakes and passwords, the numerous fees associated with 22. William Washington Brown is instructive. In the late 1860s or early 1870s, former slave Browne joined a segregated local of the Order of Templars, a temperance society. In 1873, when Browne sought an administrative position in the Order of Templars, the leaders encouraged Browne to join its mirror organization that shared the principles and goals of the Templars-but not its name. He organized the Grand Fountain of the United Order of True Reformers in 1875 in a small Alabama town. He reorganized the society in 1881 and headquartered it in the more progressive New South city of Richmond. At its height, the True Reformers operated a savings bank, real estate company, retirement home, newspaper, and store in Richmond and boasted. membership, or the internal jealousies and social jockeying that often emerged in these societies.
It was not until the 1890s that black-owned stock and mutual insurance companies formed. Ironically, most grew out of the disintegration of the True Reformers. As the True Reformers became more and more successful, Browne grew more suspicious of those in power around him. Many high-ranking True Reformers left and formed their own fraternal insurance organizations and formal insurance companies. Booker L. Jordan, former general manager of the True Reformers' Mercantile Department, co-founded the fi rst chartered black insurance company, the Southern Aid Society, in Richmond, Virginia, in 1893. 24 The number of insurance companies continued to grow.
Mississippi Life, 1908 Life, -1916 In 1908, Wayne and Minnie Cox joined these growing numbers of insurance companies when they opened the Mississippi Benefi cial Life Insurance Company, the fi rst black-owned insurance company in Mississippi. Their decision was a bold one, driven by their ambition to create "monuments of protest" after what they had suffered during the Indianola Affair. In 1910, Mississippi Life took an even more momentous step: It became the fi rst black-owned company to offer whole life insurance benefi ts. 25 Secret societies enjoyed a monopoly on insuring blacks in Mississippi. Secret societies proliferated because they required little upfront investment and were subjected to minimal regulatory oversight before the early 1910s. The most popular groups in Mississippi-and stiff competition for Mississippi Life-included the Masonic Benefi t Society, Knights and Daughters of Tabor, and Odd Fellows. In 1909, for example, no fewer than 46 black secret societies held licenses to 24. Burrell, "The Negro in Insurance." 25. The Mississippi Benefi cial Life Insurance Company was the fi rst chartered and operating black-owned legal reserve insurance company; it changed its name to Mississippi Life Insurance Company in 1920. I will use Mississippi Life to stand in for both names. In 1913, North Carolina Mutual ( NCMIC ) raised the $100,000 reserve requirement and changed its charter, making it the second chartered black-owned legal reserve insurer. Standard Life of Atlanta, under the direction of Heman Perry, became the third in March 1913. Some scholars note that NCM was the fi rst to operate as a legal reserve insurance company, but Attaway's comments at the National Negro Business League meeting in 1910 reveal that Mississippi Life offered some whole life products to Afro-Mississippians soon after changing its charter in 1910. On founding of Mississippi Life, see "Cox, Wayne Wellington," Who's Who , 79; and "W. W. Cox," Beacon Lights , 222. See Attaway's comments in W. A. Attaway, "Mutual Benefi t Insurance," Report of the Eleventh Annual Convention , [105] [106] do business in the state. None of the established black-owned insurance companies in the country operated in Mississippi, and none of them offered whole life insurance. 26 The decision to offer whole life, when no other black-owned company offered such products, was a bold and ambitious move on the part of Mississippi Life's board.
Wayne Cox and Dr. William Attaway undoubtedly pushed the board to make such a bold move. As Supreme Secretary-Treasurer of the Woodmen of Union, Wayne had fi rst-hand knowledge of the fi nancial success and popularity of fraternal insurance. As a practicing physician, Attaway was also aware of the fi nancial benefi ts. Attaway studied the available literature and taught himself the insurance business; contemporaries characterized him as "the Negro Wizard of Insurance." 27 Attaway warned that without a black-owned insurance company in Mississippi, white-owned companies would monopolize the black market. He likened the situation to economic enslavement: As fraternals faded away due to their lack of commercial sophistication, white companies swept in and blacks would be forced to carry policies that not only exploited them but also contributed nothing to their communities. Although whole life insurance products cost more than industrial insurance products, they provided an affordable investment vehicle with higher payoffs. Attaway quit his practice, which reportedly earned him $10,000 a year, to devote his full attention to Mississippi Life. 28 Mississippi Life may have been the fi rst black insurer to offer whole life, but it was not the fi rst to want to do so. The very high reserve requirement presented a major impediment for any company interested in starting a legal reserve company. Most states required a minimum $100,000 paid-in capital. By contrast, industrial insurance companies required much less, and fraternals could operate without even a formal charter in many states. In November 1910, Mississippi Life's board amended the company's charter, increasing the capital requirement. An exception in Mississippi's insurance laws allowed that only half of the capital, or $50,000, had to be paid. However, Mississippi Life could not sell whole life outside of the state until the full amount was paid. The Coxes and board raised an additional $25,000 in capital at $200 a share. Undercapitalization would only be one of the myriad problems faced by the young company. 29 The Coxes clashed with Mississippi Life's presidents. Attaway was brash and outspoken, perhaps much more than the Coxes could afford to tolerate given the threats of violence against Cox during the Indianola Affair. In addition, Attaway may have seen himself as more forward thinking than the Coxes. He proposed a number of reforms, such as constructing a black mortality table. The company failed to adopt such reforms. However, it was almost impossible for any blackowned fraternal and insurance company to construct such a table at this time. None of the companies collected and pooled together a comprehensive set of mortality statistics. In addition, only about twenty years had passed since blacks entered the fi eld, a relatively short period of time on which to base reliable calculations. Finally, no black actuaries existed. Black insurers were certainly aware of these issues and struggled to address them.
Public hostility between the Coxes and Attaway erupted when he campaigned to relocate the company's headquarters to his hometown of Greenville, a larger town nestled on the Mississippi River. However, the Coxes refused and, as majority stockholders, led the board to shut down Attaway's plans. They then removed him as president of Mississippi Life and helped elect Andrew J. Howard in 1914. 30 Howard, a math professor, possessed very little executive experience and even less insurance knowledge. He expressed only a nominal commitment to Mississippi Life-fi nancially and professionally. Howard did not fulfi ll pledges to purchase the requisite amount of stock, and he devoted little time to the day-to-day operations of the company. He continued to maintain his residence in Ebenezer, nearly 70 miles from Indianola. A manager recalled that Howard paid little attention in board meetings. He quickly adjourned meetings, collected his check, and darted out before the last train left for Ebenezer. 31 29. Stuart, Economic Detour , 284-285; and stock price from Attaway, "Mutual Benefi t Insurance," Report of the Eleventh Annual Convention , 105-106.
30. Joseph E. Walker replaced Attaway as president of Delta Penny in 1912. Though the Coxes were the largest shareholders, like some other insurance companies, they sought to build cooperation between shareholders. Thus, they sought board member buy in on decisions, regardless of who owned how many shares. Johnson, From the Driftwood , 37; and Stuart, Economic Detour , 286. On the Coxes social standing with whites in Indianola, see Powdermaker, After Freedom , 111-112; and Washington, "Most Encouraging Convention," Independent , September 20, 1906, 684-686. 31. As in other black companies in the period, executives and board members like Prof. Howard were chosen not for their experience but for their status. Stuart, Economic Detour , 286. With no effective leadership, the problems of Mississippi Life mounted: fraud, lack of experienced and qualifi ed agents and employees, and low salaries. Mississippi Life had only a few hundred thousand dollars of insurance-in-force, despite having 27 district offi ces in the state. By comparison, the fraternals Knights and Daughters of Tabor headquartered in Mound Bayou, Colored Odd Fellows in Holly Springs, and the United Reformers in Vicksburg each had more than $1 million of insurance-in-force in 1916. Mississippi Life managers and agents absconded with policy payments. Claims languished unpaid on the books. The board had not raised any additional capital in four years, and debts ballooned to $13,000. Internal rebellion wracked Mississippi Life's board, which seemed more concerned with returns on investment rather than protecting the company or enacting reforms. 32 Such poor internal housekeeping refl ected poorly on the board's management. 33 These men looked to Wayne for leadership-not Cox. As long as he tolerated the rampant fraud and mismanagement in the district and local offi ces, no one else would step forward to address it. Without a list of district or local offi ces in the state, one can only speculate 32. Fraternal fi gures in Spectator Company, "Directory of Fraternal Orders," Insurance Yearbook (1916 ), Insurance Yearbook: Life, Casualty, and Miscellaneous , Volume 45 (1916 the reasons such ineffi ciency and mismanagement were tolerated. It is likely that each board member was granted some autonomy over the offi ces in and near his hometown. As long as Wayne insured a dependable stream of dividend income, allowed board members the public stature associated with a prestigious black-owned company, and granted them autonomy over affairs in their local spheres of infl uence, they chose to do nothing to address the internal problems racking Mississippi Life.
In addition to these crippling internal problems, threats from outside caused major concern. White intimidation from individuals, competitors, and state bureaucrats threatened not only the solvency of the company but the safety and lives of its workers. White planters kept Mississippi Life agents from visiting sharecroppers and tenant farmers living on the planters' property. White agents from rival companies and ordinary citizens followed agents after they made collections, attacked them, stole the premiums collected, and tore up the policies. Executives and owners of rival companies pressured the state's Insurance Commissioner, Thomas M. Henry, to exercise whatever regulatory power-and extralegal pressure-he could call to bear to close Mississippi Life. At one point, Henry told the Mississippi Life board that the company could stay in operation "only as long as it did not get into trouble with the white agents and the white companies." 34 White insurers tested the commissioner's resolve. They charged that Mississippi Life agents tricked and pressured their black clients to switch insurers.
Wayne relied on his connections with infl uential whites on more than one occasion to convince the commissioner not to pull the company's license. 35 He could do little against the extralegal intimidation. However, by 1915, Mississippi Life and its co-founder Wayne Cox were both seriously ailing. His health steadily declined throughout 1915, and he died in a segregated cottage built specifi cally for his accommodation at Stafford Springs, a sanitarium and resort, in Vossburg, Mississippi, on April 10, 1916. 36 Minnie Geddings Cox Takes over Mississippi Life, 1916 Life, -1920 Cox immediately took full charge of her and Wayne's personal and business affairs. She managed the fi nancial affairs, paid dividends, It is important to consider why, as Secretary-Treasurer of the company since its founding, Cox ignored clear signs of mismanagement and fraud in its ranks for nearly a decade. While Wayne respected her partnership in all areas of their personal business lives-managing their scores of rental properties, lending money, and entertaining business colleagues-he could ill afford her assertiveness among his colleagues. He had to appear in charge. Wayne Cox was a well-respected businessman and politician, and Cox did not want to undermine his public image. As long as the bank remained on solid footing and the couple continued to enjoy personal success, they were content to allow the executive offi cers of Mississippi Life to operate unfettered.
If Cox chose to step into her husband's unexpired term, as some wives of powerful executives did, few would have expected her to serve in more than a titular role. For example, Jessie Gillespie Herndon became vice president of Atlanta Life after her husband Alonzo Herndon's death, but she deferred the day-to-day management of the company to her stepson and board. 38 However, Cox orchestrated a bold plan to revive Mississippi Life. Cox held the most powerful offi ce in the company: As secretary-treasurer she exercised direct control over both the company's fi nances and administrative functions. Cox became a force with which to be reckoned. She drew on the expertise of the general manager, Merah Stuart, and local Indianola physician Dr. Joseph Walker, Wayne's initial choice for president in 1908.
Cox removed Prof. Howard from offi ce, loaned Walker the money he needed to purchase the requisite number of shares, and advanced Walker's election to president of Mississippi Life in 1917. 39 Cox, along with Stuart and Walker, transformed Mississippi Life in less than a year. They sold the outstanding $40,000 in shares so the company could sell life insurance outside the state. They cured the $13,000 37. "Petition to Be Allowed to Finish Furnish Contractors, Manage Crops, Etc.," Filed May 17, 1916, and "Final Account," Filed May 18, 1917, both encumbrance, modernized offi ce procedures, increased offi ce staff, hired experienced agents, and streamlined the district offi ce system. They rooted out corruption and ineffi ciencies that had bled the company for nearly a decade. Premium income increased to over $194,000. By the end of the decade, Mississippi Life expanded into Alabama, Arkansas, and Tennessee. In 1920, premium income surpassed the half million mark (or more than $5.9 million in 2015 dollars). The entire sales force topped 250 men and women. 40 The reforms extended to the branch offi ces. Walker instituted quarterly district meetings to train and inspire agents. The district meetings were part pep rally, sales training, and industry education. The two-to three-day meetings featured luncheons, dinner banquets, and awards ceremonies with keynote speeches by Mississippi Life stockholders, offi cers, or board members. Leading sales agents in the company led sales training workshops in which agents role-played common sales scenarios, such as how to meet objections or promote the company's products. The best solutions won prizes. Training sessions featured subjects such as "Effi ciency," "Salesmanship," "An Agent's Duty," and "How to Increase a Debit." Nurses and physicians provided information about health-related topics, such as the spread and prevention of infectious diseases. The district meetings assured that agents received vital training and helped them stay committed to the company. 41 The biggest change occurred in 1919 when Cox changed the company's name, removing "Benefi cial" to create Mississippi Life Insurance Company. The name change symbolized the company's disassociation with fraternal insurance. Many insurance companies formed at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth included words like Benefi cial, Benefi t, and Benevolent in their names to link them with fraternal insurance in the minds of potential customers. By the late 1910s, many saw the association with fraternalism as a detriment. With the elision of one word, Mississippi Life asserted an identity that resonated in the context of a modern insurance industry that had become increasingly more complex, professional, and corporate. It also affi rmed that Cox was now in charge.
The changes in the company led to positive growth but not without making some complicated decisions about its customers. Though the industry emphasized the ways insurance represented provision and 40. Tucker, "Black Pride, " 437; Stuart, Economic Detour, [171] [172] 288; Lee, Beale Street , [184] [185] father Washington tried to collect the $1,000 benefi t. Mississippi Life refused to pay the full amount, claiming that Oates had an unpaid $70 loan against his policy and that his policy had lapsed a month before his death due to non-payment. The company offered to pay $150, which represented the "paid-up endowment value." 42 Oates' father sued. He produced evidence that Oates had applied for and paid off a small loan June 1918. Oates applied for a new loan for $70 but died before signing the promissory note or receiving the funds. Washington produced the unsigned policy loan agreement and Oates' cancelled checks showing premiums paid in full through March 1919. 43 The company certainly had not expected Oates to keep such accurate records. Indeed, it relied on policyholders' poor recordkeeping and lack of resolve. The decision to offer Oates's benefi ciaries a pittance, despite the fact that Oates had faithfully paid his premiums for nearly four years, refl ected a calculated decision to force the client to prove the company owed the benefi t. Whole life benefi ts paid three to ten times more than typical industrial or fraternal policies. Unlike fraternal insurers, who often made a public display of paying premiums as a way to bolster the fraternal's reputation and increase members' loyalty, Mississippi Life maintained layers of bureaucracy between themselves and the policyholder. It often made better business sense to question rather than pay claims. The court ruled against Mississippi Life and ordered it to pay the full $1,000 plus six percent interest and court costs. 44 42. The terms of the policy allowed a smaller payout based on a rate that paid nothing if death occurred in the fi rst two years, $150 in the third year, and $50 increases every year thereafter up to $1,000. P. W. Howard, "[Mississippi Life] Answer, Filed October 10, 1919," Mississippi Life v Oatis . Note that Oates' name and those of his benefi ciaries are misspelled in the court documents; see correct names in "Washington Oatis (Colored), Direct Examination," 10 and "U.S. Census, 1920 ," index and images, Reese Oatis in entry for Washington Oatis, 1920, FamilySearch, https://familysearch.org/pal:/MM9.1.1/M43W-2NL .
43. "Summary" (pp. 3-4); "Washington Oatis (Colored), Direct Examination" (pp. 9-32), and "Note, Policy No. 1686, June 6, 1918" (pp. 24-25) Despite losing some suits, Mississippi Life was a veritable success. Unfortunately, its newfound success made it even more vulnerable to white hostility. It again became the target of marked resentment from white companies who refused to stomach serious competition. In addition, the mass migration of blacks out of the South for betterpaying jobs and opportunities in the North and Midwest occurred at a time when wartime demand for cotton and foodstuffs augured unprecedented demand and profi ts for planters. More than 100,000 blacks left Mississippi between 1915 and 1920. The mass movement of blacks fueled resentment and heightened anxieties. 45 White men in Indianola, their ranks swelled by poor white migrant workers, subjected the company to a sinister but long-standing form of harassment: They sexually threatened and may even have attacked the company's female offi ce workers and sales agents. 46 The headquarters maintained an estimated workforce of fewer than 20 people, but the presence of the black women who worked there did not go unnoticed. Working at Mississippi Life enhanced black women's options and fi nancial autonomy. Census records highlight that at least one of the women working as a sales agent reported that she did not know how to read or write. 47 It is not known if she worked strictly on commission or received some wage, but working as an agent was infi nitely better than the only other jobs available to black women in Indianola: domestic, washer woman, and laborer.
By 1919, the widow Cox could no longer rely on the intercession of the infl uential whites she and her husband had cultivated for nearly 40 years. Perhaps these sympathetic whites had passed away, succumbed to the intimidation of their peers, or performed their own social calculus and believed continued association with Cox was more a detriment than a benefi t. However, it is more likely that Cox performed her own calculus. Indeed, communities around the country were erupting in riots and indiscriminate violence, fueled in part by resistance to black soldiers returning from service in World War I and to black migration. In the Mississippi Delta region, one of the most violent riots in U.S. history occurred in 1919 in Elaine, 46. The record is sparse with regard to documenting specifi c incidents and attacks; see Johnson, From the Driftwood , 39. On poor white workers migrations across the Mississippi Delta, see Woodruff, American Congo , 42. 47. Number of employees in the home offi ce estimated from census data. Sales agent Lucille Washington is listed in the 1920 census as not knowing how to read or write; see note 48.
Arkansas, when mobs there brutally repressed an agricultural labor reform movement. 48 Cox refused to tolerate the threat of rape and the explicit comments and gestures directed against her female workforce-and, indirectly, against their husbands, brothers, fathers, and male co-workers. She certainly realized that lynchings and mob violence were the only one-sided "justice" blacks resisting sexual terror would ever receive. She also realized many whites in the small town and largely rural county would never countenance the sight of women like sales agent Lucille Washington; clerks Willie May Brown, Marthia Porter, Paeolo Wallace, Velma Capshaw; and stenographer Minnie Ashwood. Many whites felt these women should be working in their kitchens or fi elds-not in the headquarters of one of the largest black-owned life insurers in the country. They expressed their outrage through violence and intimidation. Blacks responded through organized protest, armed resistance, and fl ight, which comprised grassroots and associational resistance in the period. Cox decided to move the headquarters of the company to Memphis. 49 In 1919, Cox approached the board with the idea of moving the company out of the state. New Orleans was offered as a possible new location, but Cox and a number of other board members settled on Memphis because of its geographical, economic, and strategic advantages. It was about 135 miles north of Indianola, and both the city's black population and "Black Wall Street," anchored by Beale Street, were thriving. By 1920, only a handful of black fraternals offered insurance in Tennessee, though Mississippi Life, North Carolina Mutual, Atlanta Life, and Standard Insurance of Atlanta, the other leading black-owned legal reserve insurers, operated small district offi ces in the city. 50 The board tried to keep the company's move a secret, but word of its plans leaked. The backlash was immediate. Dr. Joseph E. Walker recalled local reactions: "[M]any of the local stockholders sold their stock; policyholders threatened to cancel their policies; school teachers met and sent in petitions; [and] to boost the great enterprise now spoke out against it." 51 Those white merchants who profi ted from the business of the company's employees and customers also complained bitterly about Mississippi Life's planned departure.
The reaction of state regulators was more perplexing. As long as the company obeyed the insurance laws and displayed the proper obeisance, regulators avoided efforts to close the company. Commissioner Henry was unwilling to part with the $100,000 in assets and securities deposited with the state. The business could move, but its money had to remain. To avoid a protracted battle, Cox left the company seal in the hands of fellow board member and close friend W. W. Phillips in Kosciusko, Mississippi, and on August 19, 1920, left for Memphis. Mississippi Life opened its new headquarters at 234 Hernando Street in Memphis. 52 The Beginning of the End of Mississippi Life, 1920 Life, -1923 The "Delta blues" followed Cox to Memphis. A Mississippi Insurance Department examiner trekked to Memphis and claimed the company was impaired $20,000 through mismanagement in the Ordinary Department. Cox disagreed with the examiner but wrote a personal check to cure the impairment. In February 1921 at the stockholders meeting held in Clarksdale, Mississippi, Cox and the board discharged the supervisor of the Ordinary Department. The time in Clarksdale proved profi table for Cox: She convinced several smaller stockholders to sell her their shares, strengthening her majority position in the company. By 1923, she owned 85 percent of the shares in Mississippi Life, which were worth the equivalent of $1.2 million in 2015 dollars. 53 Memphis also presented its own kind of "blues." White resentment had been a problem in Indianola, and now, as one of the largest and newest black-owned business in Memphis, black resentment became a serious problem. Mississippi Life's home offi ce at the corner of Hernando Street and Beale Street physically represented the company's imperfect entry into Memphis's black community.
Beale businesses and communities. 54 By the end of World War I, Beale Street boasted two banks with combined deposits of $1.5 million (or $17.9 million in 2015 dollars), a coffi n manufacturing company with a factory in Memphis and assembly plants in fi ve other cities, a grocery store chain with 15 stores, a hotel, nightclubs, restaurants, and other service businesses. 55 People of all classes mingled on and around Beale Street. Mississippi Life became the largest business near Beale Street when it opened its new offi ce in the late summer of 1920. However, its arrival revealed some of the deep fi ssures of intraracial politics and class in the city.
The company's icy reception was part formal politics and part cultural politics. Robert R. Church Jr., scion of one of the wealthiest blacks in the country, and arguably the most infl uential black in Memphis and the Mid-South, controlled Memphis politics. Church, a Republican, founded the Lincoln League in 1916 and helped form the state's fi rst National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( NAACP ) branch after a gruesome lynching in 1917. Because Republicans had almost no chance of election in the solidly Democratic South, Church backed Democrats at the local level whom he believed would help blacks. As a testament to Church's political infl uence, 19 of the 20 candidates for local offi ces in the fall of 1918, including mayor, had been promoted and supported by Church and his Lincoln League. However, once elected, many politicians reneged on campaign promises to black constituents. 56 Mississippi Life ventured into this dynamic political, economic, and social climate-but not completely unaware. George W. Lee served as district manager of Mississippi Life's Memphis offi ce. Lee's ambition and business acumen established him as one of Church's most important machine lieutenants. However, Joseph Walker strongly resisted entreaties to join the Church faction. It is not known if Cox supported Church's powerful political machine. Whether she did or not, she gained the ire of Church's enemies who assumed she allied with him and the enmity of Church supporters who assumed she had not. 57 54. For a broad survey of African American business enclaves, see Butler and Wilson, "Entrepreneurial Enclaves"; and Quincy T. Mills, "Black Wall Street," Ibid., 5, 10, 93, [117] [118] [119] [120] [121] [122] Holtzclaw, Black Magnolias , 164 ; and Johnson, From the Driftwood , 50. The other part of the hostility to Mississippi Life stemmed from cultural politics. Memphis's black civic-business elite was not necessarily a tight-knit community, but the looming presence of Mississippi Life could not be ignored. Cox did not seek its good graces as part of her tactical calculation in moving to Memphis. A contemporary observed that "no invitations to open doors were extended for publicity meetings, no public banquets were held, no private dinners were served, nor was there publicised [ sic ] anywhere an 'Open House.'" 58 It is also not likely that she curried favor from Memphis's circle of elite black women beyond maintaining ties with those friends and acquaintances she already had. The unintentional snub moved Memphis's black middle class to shun Mississippi Life in social and economic circles. 59 By 1923, Cox wished to sell her company. Her decision may have been motivated by the company's success or her frustration with other well-to-do blacks. Mississippi Life's president Dr. Joseph Walker probably expressed some reservations about the sale. A cautious and conservative executive, he certainly insisted on a full vetting of any potential buyer. Cox relied on Walker in the past, but now he represented an impediment. She needed him out. She nominated her son-in-law Dr. Wayne Howard of Bessemer, Alabama, for president, and demanded Walker's resignation.
At fi rst, Walker refused to step down. He trusted his long record of accomplishments to speak well of his benefi t to the company. It is not clear how much money he still owed Cox on her 1916 loan that allowed him to buy the required number of shares to sit as president of the company. The move to Memphis exhausted his personal savings. If he still owed Cox money, she probably exercised that leverage over him. Unable to prevail over Cox, Walker formally resigned on February 22, 1923. Dr. Howard, unlike his brother, former president Prof. Andrew Howard, did not assume even token responsibility at Mississippi Life. He remained in Alabama rather than move to Memphis. Cox, in complete control of every aspect of Mississippi Life, could direct its sale with no interference. 60 58. Johnson, From the Driftwood , 43. 59. Walker's biographer attributed the icy reception of the company to Memphis business leaders who considered Walker "a 'little fry' coming out of the cotton fi elds of Mississippi" (Ibid., 47). On Memphians' reactions to Mississippi Life, see "Joseph Edison Walker," in Mississippi Black History Makers , 172, and Johnson, From the Driftwood , 47. Revenue fi gures from Stuart, Economic Detour , 224. 60. Walker's biographer's version of events is that Heman Perry traveled to Bessemer, Alabama, to convince Cox's son-in-law to sell the company. Perry maligned Walker's reputation, which led Dr. Howard to oust Walker during the stockholder meeting. This version of events confers far too much power to Walker and Howard. It is highly unlikely that Ethyl Cox Howard would allow her husband Desire and means were only two components of a successful sale. She needed a buyer-and not just any buyer. Without question, the buyer had to be another black insurer. Appeals to race pride had been a mainstay in the black separate economy, particularly among insurance companies, large and small. The fi eld of potential buyers was small, but the right one seemed to appear in Heman Perry, founder of Standard Life Insurance Company of Atlanta. It is not known when Cox and Perry fi rst met to discuss a sale. When Perry called on her, by coincidence or invitation, his reputation as the wealthiest black fi nancier preceded him.
Perry organized Standard Life of Atlanta in 1908. In 1913, Perry brokered a fi nancial deal with Atlanta Life to protect it from white competitors. That same year, Standard Life became the fi rst black insurance company to offer whole life insurance products exclusively. The insurance company formed part of a stable of Perry companies, which included Citizens Trust Bank, an engineering and construction fi rm, and a pharmacy. In 1924, Perry gained national prominence when Forbes magazine featured him as the richest, most successful Negro businessman in the world. Among the black community, he was known as "The Daddy of Negro High Financing." 61 In Perry, Cox met a formidable ally-and foe. By the early 1920s, unknown to all but a handful of insiders, Standard Life teetered on the verge of fi nancial collapse. Perry desperately needed the assets of Mississippi Life to save his empire. Desperation led him to seek acquisition of Cox's company by unscrupulous means. Early in 1923, Perry dispatched his actuary James R. Cothran, an associate actuary to take any major action against her mother. Ethyl was fi ercely loyal to (or easily intimidated by) her mother. For example, she signed over her inherited assets and interest in her father's companies to her mother (see WWC Probate Records). In addition, Howard could not orchestrate any action among stockholders except under her direction and with her permission and support. Cox certainly orchestrated Walker's removal, not Howard. Howard made an excellent choice of replacement because he was more malleable than Walker. Walker's biographer diminishes Cox's role in the company, writing for example that Minnie Cox, "with tears in her eyes, begged [Walker] to assume the presidency" because the company "was slowly moving towards the brink of disaster and needed the strong arm of competent youth to withstay it and bring it back to a condition of normalcy. with the John A. Copeland fi rm of Atlanta, to the Mississippi Life offi ces on Hernando Street. Cothran, concealing his association with Perry and perhaps implying he was acting in an offi cial state capacity, asked to look over the company's books. The offi ce complied. He suggested that Mississippi Life engage his services and allow him to invest and grow its cash surplus. If the Mississippi commissioner balked, Cothran bragged that he would bring the power of the national professional association of actuaries to bear against Henry. 62 Initially at least, Cox was unaware of Perry and Cothran's ulterior motives. Mississippi Life did hire Cothran, a move it could not have made without Cox's knowledge or approval. Cox knew the commissioner's capriciousness regarding Mississippi Life, but she felt Cothran could provide leverage she needed against Commissioner Henry. Perhaps she felt the recent controversy over Henry's handling of state funds and his removal from offi ce for a short time in 1922 also provided leverage she needed to resist his demands. 63 To be sure, Cox's motivations may have been completely self-interested: She would agree to anything Perry wanted to grease the wheels of the sale to Standard Life.
Armed with the knowledge that Mississippi Life was indeed on solid fi nancial footing and the "cash cow" Perry needed to ease his fi nancial troubles, he then tried to woo away Cox's key employees. For example, Perry invited General Manager Merah Stuart to Atlanta and feted him in grand style: tours of the city and Perry's businesses, expensive dinners, and meetings with top executives at Standard Life. In late September 1923, Perry offered Stuart a $6,000 a year position in Standard Life's soon-to-be-launched industrial life insurance department. Perry gave Stuart little time to mull his options: The position started on November 1. 64 Stuart resigned from Mississippi Life and left Memphis for Atlanta. Once at Standard, Stuart quickly surmised that neither Perry nor anyone else was interested in creating a new industrial life department.
62. Cothran's association with Standard Life deduced from his name on Standard Life's letterhead; see images of Heman Perry to Merah S. Stuart, September 25, 1923, reprinted in Stuart, Economic Detour , 292 . On Cothran's visit to Memphis offi ce, see Stuart, Economic Detour , [290] [291] 63. Henry was accused of defaulting on nearly $50,000 in funds paid by insurance companies to his offi ce. Howard that they should sell their combined shares to Perry under the following three conditions: Perry had to pay them in cash; the minimum acceptable offer was $125 per share; and Perry had to pay attorney's fees and expenses. Cox and her attorney agreed that Perry must understand that, should he choose to sell Mississippi Life later, he could only sell to another black insurance company. 68 A few days after Atty. Howard's consultation with Cox, Perry met with the attorney to hammer out the deal at the black-owned Whitelaw Hotel in Washington, D.C. Perry agreed to all of the terms and even sweetened the deal. He offered $150 a share and offered to reimburse Cox the $20,000 she paid in 1921 to satisfy the impairment alleged by the state examiner. Howard stressed again that Cox's $128,000 65. Stuart, Economic Detour , 291-229; and Perry to Stuart, September 25, 1923. 66 . In their meeting, Stuart reminded Henry that he had only said the company could not use a specifi c actuary: Andrew Sigtenhorst. Sigtenhorst was an actuary based in Waco, Texas, who worked with some of the largest black fraternal and private insurance companies in the country. In not allowing Mississippi Life access to his expertise, Henry probably hoped to hobble the insurance company. Stuart, Economic Detour , 293. 67. Howard lived in Washington, D. C. because of his federal appointment. Though he resided in Washington, D.C., Howard was also still powerfully placed within the Mississippi Republican Party; see McMillen, "Perry W. Howard." 68. After the sale, a newspaper reported that "It was understood by Mr. Perry when he bought stock in the Mississippi Life Insurance Company that his stock would not be sold to any white concern and Perry agreed not to do so"; see "Injunction Prevents the Sale of the Mississippi Life Company," Dallas Express [Tex.], March 8, 1924, p. 2 . Other details of sale from Stuart, Economic Detour , [293] [294] (or $1.8 million in 2015 dollars) and the others' proceeds had to be paid in cash. 69 Perry assured him cash would not be a problem.
In early November, Cox, Dr. Howard and Ethyl, Atty. Howard, and Perry met in the small town of Bessemer, away from the prying eyes of Memphis. Cox was not feeling well, and it did not help her condition that Perry showed up without the cash in hand. He claimed he had simply neglected to wire the funds. Instead, he offered personal checks of $20,000 to each member of the family and $4,500 for the attorney's fees and three promissory notes for the remaining balance. Atty. Howard insisted Cox wait until the personal checks cleared before moving forward with the promissory notes. This time, she heeded his sage advice. As none of the checks cleared Citizens Trust, any doubts about Perry's fi nancial condition were confi rmed. 70 Atty. Howard, together with Lt. Lee and Stuart (who had returned to the ranks of Mississippi Life), mobilized to protect the company. The attorney threatened legal action against the state of Mississippi, and Memphis District Offi ce Manager Lt. George W. Lee and Stuart threatened to dissolve the company's debits. A desperate Perry suggested that Cox deposit $80,000 of Mississippi Life's cash surplus in Citizens Trust, which was also in dire straits. He could then use those funds to pay Cox, Dr. and Mrs. Howard, and Atty. Howard most of the money he owed them. In essence, Perry suggested using Mississippi Life's own money, much of it Cox's, to pay for her company. 71 Cox deposited $20,000 of Mississippi Life's surplus in Citizens Trust, probably against her attorney's counsel. Four of Perry's personal checks subsequently cleared. The motivations acting on Cox's decision to spend her own money to save the sale came from various quarters.
69. Merah Stuart reports that Cox owned 720 shares; a newspaper account reports that she owned 850 ("The Standard Life Shortage"). I have based these fi gures on Stuart's numbers.
70. The notes were to be paid in bi-weekly installments between November 15 and December 31, 1923. Citizens Trust was the bank organized and owned by Perry. Stuart, Economic Detour , 294-296; and Perry W. Howard to Merah Stuart, November 16, 1923, reprinted in Ibid., 297. 71. Before and after the sale, Perry did try to resolve his debts with Southeastern Trust. He declined a loan arranged by Robert R. Moton, president of Tuskegee Institute, from Julius Rosenwald, John D. Rockefeller, and Trevor Arnett. The white businessmen were willing to save Service Company to preserve "faith in black business," but they would do so only on the condition that new management was secured. Perry refused to step down. Perry then courted National Benefi t Life Insurance of Washington, D.C., but, by 1925, National Benefi t tried to buy Standard Life to keep it from falling into the hands of a white company. Ironically, the attempted purchase further undermined the National Benefi t and hastened its failure. See Mitchell, Collapse , 34-42; Henderson, "Heman E. Perry," 235; Dailey Jr., "Business Life," 679; Lee, Beale Street , 188; "Standard Life is Gobbled Up," Cleveland Gazette , January 24, 1925, 1; Stuart, Economic Detour, 299; and "Philanthropists' $500,500 Couldn't Save Standard Life," Afro-American , May 7, 1932. Her actions undercut Howard, Lee, and Stuart's efforts to save the company, but Cox must have believed that combining Mississippi Life and Standard Life would resolve Perry's fi nancial problems while achieving her ultimate goal of creating the largest black-owned life insurance company in the country. Few were aware of the seriousness of Perry's fi nancial troubles, and Cox may have believed that he needed an infusion of cash to help with a temporary fi nancial diffi culty. Perry was fi nally able to borrow the remaining funds to complete the sale from Southeastern Trust Company. Southeastern Trust already possessed virtual control of Citizens Trust and Perry's holding company, Service Company, which meant that the white-owned company effectively controlled not only Standard Life, but also Perry's numerous other fi rms. 72 On December 10, 1923, Perry and the top offi cers of Standard Life, Commissioner Henry, and a Southeastern Trust offi cer arrived at the Mississippi Life offi ces with a check for $86,000, signifi cantly less than the original terms. 73 Perry refused to give Cox the check until she and Dr. Howard transferred their stock to Service Company, elected Perry president, and elected the two Standard Life offi cers he brought with him secretary-treasurer and vice president. 74 Cox realized that her hands had been on the lever even as her carefully laid plans barreled out of control.
Cox assessed her options. Commissioner Henry's threat to revoke the company's license was more than an idle one. Atty. Howard could challenge the action in court, but it was unclear how long it would take to get the company's license reinstated or how much it would cost to do battle with the state of Mississippi. If she kept the company, she would operate in a hostile environment with the added burden of an uninterested and inexperienced president, her own son-in-law, at the helm. Walker's removal and Stuart's quick defection also gave her pause about who she could really trust. She was 54 years old, and she had spent much of her life fi ghting to build and then preserve the monument of protest she and her husband created. She took the money and signed over the company to Perry. The ink was hardly dry before the new offi cers wrote checks transferring all of Mississippi Life's liquid assets to Perry. Perry endorsed those checks to the white Southeastern Trust agent present at the meeting, a partial payment against his more than half a million in debts.
In a little over a year, Standard Life would cease to exist as well. On February 16, 1925, the remaining stockholders and the new officers met in Holly Springs, Mississippi. Secretary James RobinsonPerry did not attend-advised the stockholders that Standard Life was transferring its majority stock to Southern Life, a white-owned insurance company in Nashville connected to Southeastern Trust. The acquisition of Standard Life, fl ush with Mississippi Life accounts, immediately ranked Southern Life among the ten largest insurance companies in the South. 75 With the stroke of a pen, Mississippi Life, the monument of protest Cox and her husband built in defi ance of efforts to circumscribe black initiative, was no more.
From the beginning, Southern Life struggled with its new acquisition. 76 Black policyholders refused to pay their premiums to white agents. Many customers allowed their policies to lapse, transferred their business to other black-owned fi rms, or cashed out their policies. Mississippi Life staff and agents walked out of the Hernando offi ce in protest. Twenty-seven managers representing 600 agents in fi ve states traveled to the Memphis offi ces to join protests against the takeover. Will Harris, the owner of Southeastern Trust and new secretary-treasurer of Southern Life, publicly grumbled, "I wonder why Perry would try to sell his people to members of other races, and can't deliver [ them ] 76. Perry tried to dodge criticism for the sale by making several false claims. First, he claimed fi nancial mismanagement, personnel problems, lax medical examinations, and a negligible whole life insurance portfolio devalued the stock price to under $100. These factors in conjunction with "strong opposition within Standard Life" led him to determine that a merger between the two companies was no longer desired. He then claimed that no other black company could afford to purchase Mississippi Life at the asking price of $200 a share. He was willing to sell the company to North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company ( NCMIC ) for $40,000 less than the asking price, but the Mississippi Insurance Commissioner refused to accept these terms. Perry claims he offered to put up $20,000 of the shortfall if NCMIC would contribute an additional $20,000 and give up the Mississippi Life's ordinary (i.e., whole life insurance) debits. NCMIC and another unnamed colored company refused those terms, and Perry had no choice, for the "protection of policyholders and shareholders of Mississippi Life," but to sell to Southern Life, which offered $310 a share. The realities of the world of commerce had steeled Cox. She thought in business terms but also in terms of legacy to the race. She wanted profi ts for herself and other Mississippi Life shareholders but she also wanted to keep the company within the race. Others shared her vision for and commitment to create a powerful race company. One newspaper stressed that the merger "would give the Race [ sic ] the largest insurance company that has ever been operated by Negroes and enable them to do a work that would be very far reaching in many phases of business." 79 She chose to sell Mississippi Life to another powerful black insurance companybut not the most obvious choice, North Carolina Mutual ( NCMIC) , already the largest insurance company in the race. Her nephew defected to NCMIC , and she resented him and NCMIC for it. 80 A mixture of vision, resentment, and ambition drove Cox to create the largest black-owned life insurance company in the country as the ultimate monument of protest for a life spent fi ghting Jim Crow through enterprise.
Minnie Cox and her experiences building Mississippi Life reveal the novel experience of an enterprising black businesswoman, but her story shifts our attention away from the typical ways of describing early twentieth century black women. No extant evidence has been uncovered of Cox's involvement in the clubwomen movement 78. "Joseph Edison Walker," in Mississippi Black History Makers , 173; "Black Insurance Companies 1977: An $11 Billion Industry," Black Enterprise (June 1978), 145-146, 148, and 150, 146 and 148; Lee, Beale Street , 189-190; Stuart, Economic Detour , 305-306; Woodson, "Insurance Business," 225-226; and McMillen, Dark Journey , 185 . On details of Universal Life's founding and sale of debits, see Johnson, From the Driftwood , [75] [76] [77] [78] 79. "Injunction Prevents the Sale," 2, emphasis added. 80. The Coxes raised and educated Wayne's nephew George Wayne Cox and gave him a job at Mississippi Life. He worked his way up to manager of the Industrial Department, earning $100 a month. In 1919, George arranged a secret meeting with John Merrick, one of the founders of NCMIC , and agreed to establish the company in Mississippi, which made it a direct competitor with his aunt's company. By 1923, he secured licenses for NCMIC in Mississippi and the three other states in Mississippi Life's territory, wrote $13 million in policies, and generated an annual premium income of over half a million dollars. Cox was of a different stripe than Sable Victorians, more interested in the benefi ts of commercial aspirations than in traditional expressions of social reform and uplift. She represents a different way for black women to be: She strengthened families and left a legacy by charging fair rents and interest rates to the more than two dozen families sharecropping on her land; providing mortgages and affordable rents to hundreds of blacks living on both sides of the tracks in Indianola and in the town's rural hinterlands; hiring blacks in respectable, white-collar positions; and paying claims to sustain families in the event of a loved one's death. 82 When Mississippi Life started business in 1908, Cox's more well-known contemporary Sarah Breedlove Walker, more famously known as Madam C. J. Walker, was only just beginning to build what would eventually become a beauty culture empire. Walker had not yet rebuffed Booker T. Washington's snub at the 1912 National Negro Business League meeting with the famous washtub speech that helped crystallize a narrative of black womanhood, business ambition, activism, and uplift. Cox too was a woman of action, melding praxis and theory together as she carved out a successful business in the heart of the Mississippi Delta in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century. 83 81. Cox may have been deeply involved in church work or in a local woman's group not affi liated with the state federation or national association of Colored Women Clubs. I have not been able to fi nd her name in the available records, but the records are sparse. I feel safe assuming that the absence of her name in several years worth of extant records of the most popular fraternals, the National Association of Colored Women correspondence and administrative records, and state conventions and histories of the largest black denominations refl ect that she did not choose these common routes for black women's activism.
82. On black women's traditional activism, see Shaw, What a Woman . 83. On the last day of the National Negro Business League convention, Washington blatantly ignored repeated requests by Walker's colleague and attorney George L. Knox to recognize her from the fl oor. Washington's infamous snub led her to confront him ("Surely you are not going to shut the door in my face. I feel that I am in a business that is a credit to the womanhood of our race."), after which she began what became one of her most famous speeches. She shared her inspirational story of building a thriving beauty aids manufacturing and sales business in seven years from $1.50, stating, "I am a woman who came from the cotton fi elds of the South. With no letters or diaries and merely a few public records in her own hand, one must endeavor to understand Cox based on what she did rather than what she tells us. For Cox, the politics of respectability did not easily combine with the separate group economy to justify black women's participation in the "public," or more accurately commercial, sphere or to defend what Stephanie Shaw, a historian of black professional women, describes as "socially responsible individualism." 84 Historian Tiffany Gill notes the diffi culties black women experienced in articulating and claiming their place in black business development through "the gendered rhetoric of economics and entrepreneurship within the racial uplift ethos." 85 Minnie Cox's personal life and professional career reveal those diffi culties.
The signifi cance of individual achievement accounted for something, though one can debate how much it meant. The success and even the eventual failure of Mississippi Life celebrate Cox's hustle and business acumen but they also reveal their costs. It is important not to erase the critique of capitalism in general and the black separate economy in particular that grows organically out of the relationship between consumers and owners. Cox's relationship with the community she alternately depended on, served, and exploited reveals the precarious and fraught relationship between "black business" as "black power." Cox, her contemporaries like Maggie Lena Walker, and even her nemesis Heman Perry shared in the political, social, and economic repression borne by the masses of blacks but claimed a measure of agency that they felt distinguished them from those masses and qualifi ed them for wider rights of citizenship. Rather than stake a claim based largely on ideologies such as comportment, moral superiority, and intellectual advantages, enterprising women like Cox undergirded class distinctions based on economic reality rather 84. The politics of respectability represented a form of resistance developed among early-twentieth-century black women activists and reformers to counteract negative stereotypes and claims about black women's sexuality, morality, and femininity. Over time, various groups adopted the politics of respectability to reject popular stereotypes and to assert their rights and privileges. According to Kali Gross, by "[c] laiming respectability through manners and morality [the politics of respectability] furnished an avenue for African Americans to assert the will and agency to redefi ne themselves outside the prevailing racist discourses." The politics of respectability, however, was a double-edged sword because "its ideological nature constituted a deliberate concession to mainstream societal values" (Gross, "Examining the Politics of Respectability"). In addition, it also devalued the effects of structural systemic, and institutional discrimination and disparities. Regarding socially responsible individualism, Shaw focuses on professional, not entrepreneurial, black women and describes them as balancing ambitious goals of individual achievement with a commitment to social responsibility for the community (Shaw, What a Woman , 7 and 245n2 
